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The Scope of Discovery of Legal
Ethics in Class Action Litigation
INTRODUCTION
Rule 23 (a) (4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that in class action litigation "the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." This require-
ment must be met before the merits of the class suit are consid-
ered.1 Thus, it has become common practice for defense attorneys
to raise ethical questions regarding adequate representation by the
plaintiff, prior to reaching the substantive issues of the suit, as a
defense-tactic to the class action.2 If a defendant can show inade-
quacy ,due to some unethical practice or circumstance the suit will
not be certified as a class action and the case will be dismissed.3
1. In Miller v. Mackey International, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir.
1971) the court rejected a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a pro-
posed class action, saying: "In determining the propriety of a class action,
the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause
of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements
of Rule 23 are met." See, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177
(1974); see also, Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361 (D. So. Carolina
1974).
2. See, HAUSMANN, LEGAL ETICS AND LITIGATION TACTICs, 2 CLASS
ACTION REPORTS 3 (1971).
3. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) and 23 (c) (1), which states that: "As
soon as practicable after commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so main-
tained .... .
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Both plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney must pass muster as
adequate representatives. This applies to class actions under Rule
23 as well as to stockholder derivative suits pursuant to Rule 23.1.
Plaintiff and counsel must be able to wage a real fight with "Forth-
rightness and vigor .. . to assert and defend the interests of the
members of the class, so as to insure due process."'4
The requirement of "adequate representation" of the class raises
the question of whether the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)5
should deepen and expand in the area of legal ethics and attorney-
client privileged communications. The ethical questions raised by
defense counsel have involved three specific areas. The first has
been directed toward the lead plaintiff's6 ability to finance notice
to the absent class members. The second area focuses upon the
lead plaintiff's interest in the subject matter of the suit. The third
area concerns itself with the conduct of plaintiff's attorney regard-
ing solicitation and general misconduct.
It is important, therefore, to determine the scope of discovery
as it relates to these three areas. How far we stretch the bounds
of discovery practice must operate against the need for and the im-
portance of class action litigation. Legitimate inquiry should not be
cut off prematurely, yet indefinite expansion must be checked.
A trial court has a duty of special significance in lengthy and com-
plex cases where the possibility of abuse is always present to super-
vise and limit discovery to protect parties and witnesses from
annoyance and excessive expense . . . The need for line drawing
is particularly important in class actions where the court has super-
vised discovery and participated actively in development of the
case to prevent abuse.7
PLAINTIFF AS AN ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE
1. Plaintiffs Ability to Finance Notice
Due process requires that notice be given to absent class members
4. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.RD. 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1), provides in part that: "Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action . .. ."
6. The plaintiff who actively brings the class action is referred to as
the lead plaintiff.
7. Doglow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also,
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION, § 1.7 (1969).
because of the res judicata effect of the judgment unless they
"opt-out."'  Thus, in order for a plaintiff to be an adequate
representative, he must be able to notify all members of the class.
This costs money. Consequently, defense counsel have sought to
discover the financial assets of the plaintiff and his willingness to
use these assets to finance notice to the class and other expenses
of the suit.9
Rule 26(b) permits parties to discover matters which are "rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... 10
In Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co.," the court held
that discovery of plaintiff's ability to adequately represent the class
is a question which may "make or break" the suit and therefore
is within the 26(b) requirement of "subject matter involved in the
pending action." The defendant sought answers to the following
questions which the plaintiff refused to answer during oral deposi-
tion:
Q. Have you agreed to pay your attorney's legal fees for the work
that they perform for you?
Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you agreed to pay the legal costs involved
in this suit if there should be any?
Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you agreed to reimburse your attorney any
legal costs that might incur in the presentation of this action? 12
[emphasis supplied]
Without discussion the court granted defendant's motion to
compel answers. The problem, however, is that the court did not
delineate to what degree these questions had to be answered. What
is required to meet the "adequate representative" standard? Does
plaintiff have to show a willingness and ability to pay or merely
an understanding that if the suit fails he will be responsible for
the costs incurred?
8. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Gonzales v.
Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
9. See, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), wherein the
U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiff must bear the entire cost of notify-
ing the class and that such costs could not be ordered to be paid by
defendant even where it was probable that plaintiff would prevail. "There
is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can be
tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs." 417 U.S. at 176.
10. Supra note 5.
11. Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634, 636
(W.D. Pa. 1973).
12. Id. at 638. See also, Canon 5, Disciplinary Rule 5-103 (b) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: ". . . a lawyer shall
not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except ...
[where] the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses."
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These questions were answered in Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln
Federal Savings and Loan Association8 :
Stavrides does not say that defendants are entitled to discover
plaintiffs' financial assets in order to support an inference that the
suit is being maintained. It merely states that defendants may dis-
cover what plaintiffs had been told concerning their liability for
expenses . . . We also will allow questions as to plaintiffs' under-
standing of their liability for expenses, as long as these questions
do not compel plaintiffs to divulge confidential communications
with their counsel. 14
The defense counsel in Sayre propounded questions to plaintiffs
concerning their financial assets, their knowledge of the necessity
of paying the expenses and their willingness to pay should they
fail to win. The court held that answers were not required since
plaintiffs' attorneys stated that they would advance amounts nec-
essary to cover the costs. The court therefore reasoned that the
answers sought were not relevant to the issue of adequate represen-
tation.
Defendant, however, argued that Canon 5, Disciplinary Rule
5-103 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,'5 which permits
an attorney to advance costs only where the client remains ulti-
mately liable, established the relevancy of plaintiff's assets and
ability to pay. Albeit the attorney was advancing costs, if plaintiffs
were unwilling or unable to reimburse counsel, the counsel would
be breaching professional ethics by advancing costs without a
reasonable expectation of reimbursement and thus would be unfit
to represent the class. 16
The Sayre court, however, disagreed and refused to compel
answers regarding professional ethics. Instead, the court refused
13. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings and Loan Association,
65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
14. Id. at 386.
15. Supra note 12.
16. See, P.D.Q. Inc. of Miami v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D.
Fla. 1973), wherein the party plaintiffs in a class action testified that they
would not be willing and could not afford to pay the costs of the suit. The
court held that plaintiff counsel's offer to advance costs was not acceptable
because, if plaintiffs were not willing or able to pay the costs, there was no
basis to assume that they would be willing to reimburse counsel. To avoid
this problem the court narrowly defined the class such that the costs of
notice would be within plaintiff's means.
to allow defendants' discovery when it was clear that the litigation
could be financed to its end.
[T]he question of the plaintiffs' ability to reimburse counsel will
predictably reappear whenever counsel is advancing funds to plain-
tiffs. It is this Court's judgment-admittedly based on experience
and hunch rather than any collected empirical data-that to deny
a class whenever plaintiffs' counsel advances significant funds to
plaintiffs of little or modest means would be to defeat the very pur-
pose which class actions were designed to achieve. This is particu-
larly true where, as here, the costs of litigating the suit would
exceed the damages allegedly sustained by an individual plaintiff.
In other words, in precisely those cases where the class action
device is most appropriate the disparity between the costs of litiga-
tion and the resources of the individual plaintiffs will be most
pronounced. As much as we are concerned with possible unethical
conduct by counsel, we cannot condone a policy which would effec-
tively limit class action plaintiffs to corporations, municipalities, or
the rich .... [U]ntil some independent evidence is brought to
this Court's attention we can see no purpose to be served by the
costly and time consuming process of inquiring into plaintiff's
financial status.17
In Sanderson v. Winner,18 the Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court's interlocutory decree"9 ordering the plaintiff to pro-
duce income tax returns for two years prior to initiating the suit
along with any other writings or documents that would reflect
plaintiff's ability to finance the litigation.
Ordinarily courts do not inquire into the financial responsibility of
litigants. We generally eschew the question whether litigants are
rich or poor. Instead, we address ourselves to the merits of the
litigation. We recognize that the class action is unique and we see
the necessity for the court to be satisfied that the plaintiff or plain-
tiffs can pay the notice costs, and we also agree fully with the
Court's ruling in Eisen that due process requires decent notice.
But, we do not read Eisen as creating a presumption against find-
ing a class action. Nor does it approve oppressive discovery as a
17. 65 F.R.D. at 385. See also, Bogosian v. Gulf Oil, 337 F. Supp. 1228,
1229 (E.D.Pa. 1971) where the court held that "questions concerning the
circumstances surrounding the bringing of the present suit, including
plaintiff's arrangement with his counsel for bearing costs of this litigation
.. . are outside the scope of discovery . .. ."
18. Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974).
19. The District Court had refused to certify an interlocutory appeal.
Plaintiff brought writs of mandamus and prohibition. With respect to
appellate review of interlocutory decrees, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. at 169-71. The Supreme Court held that appellate review under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 is not limited to final judgments which terminate an
action. The court cited its decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949):
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally
determine claims of rights separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate considera-
tion be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
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means of discouraging a private antitrust action which, if meritor-
ious, advances an important interest of the government. 20
This holding goes a great deal further than Sayre in limiting
discovery of the plaintiff's ability to finance the suit-perhaps too
far. In Sayre the court was satisfied with a showing that the plain-
tiff had sufficient financial backing to follow the suit through to
its end. The court in Sanderson, however, does not demand this
assurance. Instead the court states that "[d] efendant will have
ample opportunity for discovery under Rule 69 F. R. Civ. P. if it
obtains judgment."21
Rule 6922 aids a judgment creditor by permitting discovery of
assets of the judgment debtor. Discovery under Rule 69, however,
takes place only after a judgment in favor of defendant, long after
the need for notice to absent class members would arise. Due proc-
ess requires some guarantee to the absent class members that their
rights will be adequately represented. In Sayre, these rights were
considered. There, the court had plaintiff counsel's promise to ad-
vance costs. Moreover, the court held that it did not have to take
counsel's promise on face value, but could require the posting of a
bond to cover the costs of notice or, if counsel failed to pay the cost,
could "decertify" the class in order to protect the members from the
res judicata effect.28
2. Plaintiffs Interest in the Subject of the Class Action
Defense counsel have argued that plaintiff's lack of legitimate
interest in the outcome of the suit renders him an inadequate
representative of the class because it leaves the plaintiff's attorney
who is not similarly situated vis i vis the cause of action of the
class to act as a party plaintiff himself.
In Graybeal v. American Savings and Loan Association,24 the
20. 507 F.2d at 479-80.
21. Id. at 480.
22. FED. R. Cirv. P. 69, provides in part that: "In aid of the judgment
or execution, the judgment creditor . . .may obtain discovery from any
person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these
rules or in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the
district court is held."
23. 65 F.R.D. at 384.
24. Graybeal v. American Savings and Loan Association, 59 F.R.D. 7
(D.D.C. 1973).
court found inherent conflicts of interest where the lead plaintiff
was also the attorney representing the class. The court disqualified
him as an adequate representative because of these conflicts:
In any class action there is always the temptation for the attorney
for the class to recommend settlement on terms less favorable to
his clients because a large fee is part of the bargain. The impro-
priety of such a position is increased where, as here ... the poten-
tial recoveries by individual members, including representatives, of
the class are likely to be very small in proportion to the total
amount of recovery by the class as a whole. Thus Plaintiffs may
stand to gain little as class representatives, but may gain very much
as attorneys for the class. 25
This position emphasizes that while plaintiff and counsel have
representative responsibilities, their interests in the outcome of the
suit may not be the same. The court in Graybeal speaks of a
"temptation" on the part of the attorney to settle the case for a
large fee while the class plaintiff might want to continue in order
to vindicate his claim. Thus, the court requires a plaintiff with
an interest in the claim of the action, and not an interest in
attorney's fees, to properly represent the absent class members in
deciding what course to take in the litigation, i.e., whether or not
to settle. Discovery regarding family or economic ties between the
lead plaintiff and attorney is appropriate, therefore, to insure that
there are no conflicts of interest between the lead plaintiff and
absent class members.26
In Lieb v. 20th Century Corporation,27 it was held that:
The class ia entitled to more than blind reliance upon even compe-
tent counsel by uninterested and inexperienced representatives ...
An attorney who prosecutes a class action with unfettered discre-
tion becomes, in fact, the representative of the class. This is an
unacceptable situation because of the possible conflicts of interest
involved.28
25. Id. at 13-14.
26. See, Kriger v. European Health Spa Inc., of Milwaukee Wisconsin,
56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972), where plaintiff who was an attorney asso-
ciated with the firm representing him was held an inadequate representa-
tive. Cf. Stull v. Pool, 18 F.R. Serv. 2d 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); class action
certification refused where plaintiff was the wife of attorney who was
representing the class. See also, Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 56
F.R.D. 442 (D.Ariz. 1972). But see, Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59
F.R.D. 25, 31 (S.D.Iowa 1972) where the court permitted an attorney
representing the class and also a party plaintiff to continue "[A] ny fees
Mr. Mead earns as an attorney in this cause will be for services rendered
in the pursuit thereof, a wholly different proposition than recovery of
some sum in redress."
27. Lieb v. 20th Century Corporation, 61 F.R.D. 592 (M.D.Pa. 1974).
28. Id. at 594-5.
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In this case the party plaintiffs were a "housewife" and a
"student" 29 who were shareholders in the defendant corporation.
Neither had business experience, and the court found that they
were relying solely upon their attorneys. But the court was not
as troubled with the plaintiffs' lack of business experience as by
their lack of interest. The court said that "[e] ven unknowledgeable
and inexperienced plaintiffs might meet the requirements of Rule
23 by demonstrating a keen interest in the progress and outcome
of the litigation."3 0  [emphasis supplied]
Yet, the criteria of a "keen interest" by the plaintiff leaves the
question of certification of the action to the subjective discretion
of the trial judge. The reasons proffered by the court in Lieb do
not lead to a conclusion of inadequacy. Being a "housewife" or
a "student" without business experience should not prevent a plain-
tiff from representing those similarly situated.
The court in Dorfman v. First Boston Corporation3' was faced
with a similar argument from defense counsel. It was argued that
because plaintiff had stated at her deposition that she was "satis-
fied" with her "good investment" and seemed confused over her
representative status, and that because Juster, the other lead plain-
tiff, stated that he retained eight of the six hundred debentures
"as a matter of principle. . . to see the action through," plaintiffs
would not vigorously prosecute the action and were therefore
inadequate representatives. The court disagreed:
Neither the personality nor the motives of the plaintiffs is deter-
minative of whether they will provide vigorous advocacy for the
members of the class. Dorfman is obviously unschooled in the law
and was flustered at her deposition but it can hardly be said that
she, through her attorney, has been anything but a vigorous and
tenacious plaintiff. The same may be said of Juster; principle,
coupled with the hope of rectifying a claimed loss and the prospect
of a substantial recovery, may be as strong a spur to vigorous
prosecution as many other motivations. 32
If the motives of the plaintiffs in bringing suit 'are not to be
considered, what guarantee is there that plaintiff is a real party
29. These are the court's characterizations of the party plaintiffs. 61
F.R.D. at 595.
30. Id.
31. Dorfman v. First Boston Corporation, 62 F.R.D. 466 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
32. Id. at 473.
in interest and not a strawman who is merely supplying his name
to enable the attorney to bring the action? The answer is that there
is no such guarantee nor should one be required.8 3 Unless there
is evidence indicating unethical conduct, the scope of discovery
should not extend into the area of plaintiff's motives because such
is not within the relevancy requirement of Rule 26 (b) .4
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY AS ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE
Along with his normal duties to his client, the plaintiff's attorney
in a class 'action has additional fiduciary obligations to the absentee
plaintiffs whom the attorney is also representing.8 5 Thus, the
question has arisen whether these additional responsibilities enlarge
the scope of discovery to include ethical considerations surrounding
the manner in which counsel was retained and the general conduct
of the attorney.
1. Pre-suit Communication (Solicitation)
In Magida v. Continental Can Company,8 6 a 16(b) class action
for "short-swing" profits, defendant argued that plaintiff's attorney
had advised plaintiff to buy stock for the purpose of suing and that
plaintiff's lawyer had agreed to absorb the costs in the event that
the suit was unsuccessful. In describing defendant's allegations, the
court stated that "'defendant hints darkly that plaintiff is only a
'tool' or 'dummy' for his lawyers and suggests that there may be
some sort of illicit agreement among them which would bar
plaintiff in this equity suit. '37
The court, however, held that questions regarding the fee agree-
ment were within the attorney-client privilege; while the existence
of a fee agreement was outside the scope of the privilege and thus
discoverable, the terms of such an agreement were within its pur-
view and immune from discovery.
Yet the attorney-client privilege cannot be effectively used to bar
inquiry into areas of unethical solicitation.38  The privilege protects
33. But see, Stella v. Kaiser, 87 F.Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Plain-
tiff was directed to answer questions regarding his good faith in motivating
the action.
34. See, Amherst Leasing v. Emhart Corp., 65 F.R.D. 121 (D.Conn.
1974).
35. See, Greenfield v. Villiger Industries, 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3rd Cir.
1973).
36. Magida v. Continental Can Company, 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37. Id. at 75.
38. "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
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communications from the client to the attorney, not vice versa. Its
purpose is to secure peace of mind and freedom of expression for
the client in seeking legal advice.89
Due to the added burden of the costs of notice in class actions,
as distinguished from the individual suit, a larger scope of discovery
is warranted in order to ensure that such costs can be paid. But
there is no added burden distinguishing class actions from individ-
ual suits on ethical questions regarding solicitation by plaintiff's
attorney. Thus, there is no basis to expand the scope of discovery.
In Formost Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Company,40 an
action brought under the Sherman Act, defendants propounded
questions concerning discussions among plaintiffs which led to the
filing of the complaint, the manner in which plaintiffs' participation
in the suit was solicited and arrangements for attorney's fees. The
court held such inquiry to be irrelevant and therefore non-discover-
able.
[I]t is difficult to see how an inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the instigation of the action could affect the substance
of the claim. These responses might lead to embarrassing admis-
sions of champerty or unconscionable arrangements as to fees and
expenses, but these excesses are not in any way relevant to the trial
of the particular issue.4 1
The Western District Court of Pennsylvania attempted to control
solicitation by promulgating Local Rule 34(d) 42 which prohibited
communication by plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel with any potential
class member unless the court approved. 48  The Third Circuit
resulting from that advice ." Code of Professional Responsibility, D.R.
2-104(A).
39. See, Giordani v. Hoffman, 278 F.Supp. 886 (E.D.Pa. 1968) wherein
the court held that plaintiff's attorney could not refuse to answer ques-
tions regarding information he had obtained from a third party by merely
relating it to the client and then claim it was within the attorney-client
privilege.
40. Formost Promotions Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Company, 15 F.R.D. 128(N.D.Ill. 1953); an antitrust suit, not a class action.
41. Id. at 130.
42. Local Rule 34(d): "No communication concerning such [class]
actions shall be made in any way by any of the parties thereto, or by their
counsel, with any potential or actual class member, who is not a formal
party to the action, until such time as an order may be entered by the
court approving the communication."
43. FsD. R. Civ. P. 83 permits each District Court to make rules gov-
Court of Appeals, however, in Rodgers v. United States Steel Cor-
poration,4 4 held that Local Rule 34(d) was inconsistent with the
policy of Rule 23.
There is no federal common law offense of barratry, and the policy
reflected in Rule 23 undoubtedly would prevent the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania from interfering, in the guise of preventing bar-
ratry, with its full implementation .... The limited issue before
us, however, is whether the district court can prior to making a
class action determination, insist on compliance with Local Rule
34(d) .... We hold that it may not.46
Without some independent and cogent evidence of unethical prac-
tice by plaintiff's counsel the tactic of using discovery to search
out possible acts of solicitation is an expensive and time consuming
practice which cannot be justified.
2. Attorney Misconduct
Courts have exhibited great hesitancy in withholding class certi-
fication because of misconduct of plaintiff's attorney. In Korn v.
Franchard,"4 class certification was denied when counsel was
found to have sent unauthorized letters under a pseudonym in an
attempt to "stir up litigation" in violation of Canon 2 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Yet the class was later certified by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals after substitution of new
counsel for the plaintiff.47
In Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart Incorporated,4 8 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dis-
missal of the class for solicitation by the plaintiff's counsel: "Only
the most egregious misconduct on the part of plaintiff's lawyer
could ever arguably justify denial of class status. The ordinary
erning its practice which are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
44. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corporation, 508 F.2d 152 (3rd Cir.
1975).
45. Id. at 163-64.
46. CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. f 92,845, 90,169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
47. Korn v. Franchard Corporation, 456 F.2d 1206 (2nd Cir. 1972). Cf.
Taub v. Glickman, 14 F.R. Serv. 2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) wherein a class
action was dismissed when the plaintiff's attorney defaulted on two calen-
dar calls and failed to appear in support of one of their own motions.
Moreover, these were the same attorneys who were dismissed in Korn v.
Franchard mentioned in text. The court considered all these factors in
concluding that atorneys were inadequate representatives. See also, Smith
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 F.R.Serv. 2d 1021 (D.
N.D.Tex. 1972); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F.Supp.
622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
48. Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart Incorporated, 458 F.2d 927
(7th Cir. 1972).
[VOL. 3: 98, 1975J Class Action Litigation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
remedy is disciplinary action against the lawyer ... -49 Here the
plaintiff's attorney had been retained by a group of franchisees to
file -a class antitrust action. The attorney sent a letter to other
franchisees similarly situated informing them of the suit. The
Court of Appeals found this to be a "slight breach of ethics," °
but one which should not prejudice the rights of the client. The
case was remanded with instructions not to consider pre-suit
communications.
CONCLUSION
Class actions have become one of the most socially useful tools
of the law. Victims of consumer fraud and antitrust and securi-
ties violations can vindicate their claims through the class action
device where no other remedy for the individual plaintiff is eco-
nomically practicable. The cases discussed herein reflect the policy
of the courts to favor class actions by their narrow construction
of the Rule 23(a) (4) requirement of "adequate representation" of
the class by plaintiff.
The major distinguishing characteristic between the class action
and the individual suit is the need to account for the rights of the
absent class members. Discovery, therefore, has been enlarged to
encompass whether plaintiff can finance notice to absentee plain-
tiffs. Yet, in order to encourage class actions it is suggested that
this inquiry be limited to any assurance of financial backing, either
by plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel, or by some other source. For, to
require the lead plaintiff to prove that he alone can finance the
action would effectively limit the use of the class action to the rich.
Both plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel have representative respon-
sibilities to the class, yet their interests in the outcome of the suit
may be different. While the attorney may win a large fee in an
early settlement of the case, the plaintiff's economic interest in the
outcome of the class action is generally nominal, and his goal of
vindicating the wrong perpetrated upon himself and those similarly
situated may not be accomplished by settlement. It is therefore
appropriate discovery practice for the defense counsel to deter-
mine whether any economic conflicts of interest exist between
plaintiff and his attorney.
49. Id. at 932.
50. Id. at 931.
Inquiry into plaintiff's motives in instituting the suit, however,
is not warranted. The fact that plaintiff has brought the action
should sufficiently evidence his interest in correcting the alleged
wrong against the class. The Federal Rules do not impose any
requisite degree of interest or motive on a plaintiff bringing a class
action.
As to ethical questions of solicitation, there is no basis for
distinction between the class action and the individual suit. It is
certainly proper for defense counsel to bring to the attention of
the Court and Bar any cogent evidence of unethical practices on
the part of plaintiff counsel. However, it is not the job of defense
counsel to use discovery, under the guise of assuring an "adequate
representative," to blindly search out possible acts of solicitation
by plaintiff's attorney.
Finally, where some unethical conduct has been established the
courts have not permitted such conduct to bar an otherwise meri-
torious class suit. It is suggested that the proper action of the court
is to either reprimand the attorney or allow for the substitution of
new counsel.
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